By Jonathan Michael Feldman, April 24, 2022
The esteemed Social Democratic debater Daniel Suhonen argues in Aftonbladet (April 23rd) that persons from the 1968 generation have argued against NATO membership even though Russia invaded Ukraine just like the U.S. invaded Vietnam. Therefore, he sees some double standard. Suhonen writes as if U.S. intervention stopped in 1975, the last year of the Vietnam war. He must be aware that NATO membership puts Sweden in an alliance with the U.S. and U.K. who are contributing to mass killing in Yemen through their arms exports. This isn’t a question of two wrongs making a right. It’s a question of two wrongs making two wrongs.
As Bruce Riedel explains in a post in the Brookings Institution dated February 4, 2021, SIPRI shows that Saudi Arabia was the leading importer of weapons from 2015 to 2019, the Yemen war’s first five years. Despite concerns about Saudi Arabia’s military intervention in Yemen, both “continued to export arms to Saudi Arabia from 2015 to 2019.” Saudi Arabia got 73% of its weapons from the United States and 13% from the United Kingdom. In addition, another post by the Swedish Development Forum documents Sweden’s role in supplying weapons related to the conflict. Others point out how Swedish weapons have been used in the war. If we are supposed to be in a military alliance against countries responsible for attacks on innocent countries or countries being bombed and slaughtered, then Swedes (or non-Swedes) using Suhonen’s logic should be in a military alliance against Sweden. Yemen deaths were expected to reach 377,000 by the end of 2021 according to a November 23, 2021 report. Obviously such an alliance against Sweden makes no sense, which is why Suhonen’s arguments about joining NATO are unconvincing.
A second argument is that Russia directly intervened against Ukraine so the two situations are different. By this logic, Sweden should be in a military alliance against Saudi Arabia and any state attacking Yemen. Does that make any sense either? No. So Suhonen’s arguments do not convince.
A third counter-argument is that Russia is an aggressive power close by in Europe unlike threatening Saudi Arabia which is far away. What makes Russia aggressive? They attacked another state, Ukraine, and before that Syria and Chechnya (although that was within their boundaries and might be negated by some). Yet, while that is true, in recent years the U.S. has attacked Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, and they are also nearby with about 40 military bases in Germany. So, a state militarily near Sweden (the U.S.) attacks other states but no Swedes are rushing to be in a military alliance against the U.S. The counterargument might be that Sweden is informally allied with the U.S. (NATO) and so the U.S. won’t attack it. Yet, it’s Sweden’s (informal if not formal) alliance with the U.S. (NATO) which precisely makes Sweden vulnerable to Russian attacks or harassment. I begin to think that Sweden wants to join NATO because it is already halfway in NATO, but it should be more than halfway out of NATO.
A fourth counter-argument is that the U.S. and Ukraine are democracies unlike Russia or Saudi Arabia. This argument does not work very well. One reason is that the U.S. military industrial complex and its alliance system encompassing NATO are precisely what weakens democracy in the U.S. These forces engage in military campaigns in Yugoslavia, Libya and Ukraine in ways that ratchet up defense spending when many people in the U.S. can barely afford house payments, food, or other necessities. These military forces concentrate military, economic, political and military power. By Sweden legitimating all that, they diminish the very democracy in the U.S. which they claim to value. When it comes to the Ukrainian state, the democracy over there has bombed civilian areas of the Donbass, something which is not very democratic.
Suhonen continues by writing that joining NATO is “necessary because we hardly have any real alternatives when Finland joins.” He writes that “Putin’s aggression now kills the possibility of freedom of alliance to such an extent that not even the language of the old policy works.” This argument buries the role of Sweden diminishing its security vis-à-vis Russia by virtue of its offensive projection against Russia as I have argued elsewhere. If Sweden were to devalue its diplomatic capital less, it would have less need for an alliance with NATO. There is no evidence that Putin’s invasion of Ukraine represents a direct threat against Sweden aside from some axiom with zero evidence. In contrast, Finland and Sweden’s neutrality have clearly had benefits. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine changes absolutely nothing when it comes to the security of these countries, aside from the ways the countries chose to diminish their diplomatic capital in response and thereby volunteer to weaken their security. Putin invaded Ukraine because of its collaboration with NATO. Or, if you want to believe Putin’s ranting about Ukraine really being part of Russia, or threats to Russians in Ukraine, etc., then none of those reasons apply to Sweden or Finland.
Suhonen continues, “the betrayal of a possible Swedish freedom of alliance was taken by the politicians who dismantled our national defense and thus our capacity to defend ourselves.” He adds, “no strong left-wing voices were heard when the defense capacity disappeared.” I would argue that significant investments in military spending were sold to the public for reasons of bolstering neutrality, but the reality was more like neutrality helped sell large investments military spending to the public. Why? Because first we were told we needed large military spending for neutrality. Now we are told we need large military spending to be in NATO (or perhaps because of the Russian threat). Does the Russian threat really explain Swedish security needs? I argue it does not. The Russian threat is continually exaggerated to keep military budgets high. Nothing has changed.
The capacity to provide security for Sweden is a function of at least four things: (a) weapons systems, (b) capacity to plan, (c) diplomatic capital, e.g. perception of a state’s non-aggression towards other states, and (d) ability to meet other security needs without their being compromised by any other the aforementioned factors. Building up (a) when (b), (c) and (d) are diminished is counter-intuitive.
When it comes to (b), we see that many journalists, military types, politicians and self-professed security experts engage in “bad faith.” By that I mean that the idea of joining NATO amounts to a kind of “security performance” which demonstrates to various audiences that the Russian invasion has been ratified as a threat and by joining NATO the symbolic capital associated with doing so can be taken to the political bank. What bank? The bank controlled by the dominant frameworks in the Swedish mass media, security experts whose careers are tied to finding or proclaiming Russian threats, military leaders, right-wing political parties and their allies in the Swedish ruling coalition.
How do I know that a “security performance” is going on? One reason I know is from an article by Jenny Nyman in Dagens Nyheter, from April 7, 2022, entitled, “Promised places in Stockholm still lack terrorist barriers” [Utlovade platser i Stockholm saknar ännu terrorhinder]. The online version of this article is entitled “Five years after the terrorist attack – designated risk areas still lack traffic barriers.” The article begins, “five years have passed since the attack on Drottninggatan” (the most deadly terrorist attack in recent years in Sweden on a main walking street). Nyman continues, “nevertheless, Stockholm has not raised traffic barriers in all places that the police and the municipality have identified as risk zones for vehicle attacks.” Bengt Stenberg, quoted in Nyman’s article, says, “the absolute majority of places have had obstacles.” Well, obviously terrorists planning attacks will look for where obstacles are missing. Here is a real threat, but those talking about the Russian threat say little about this real threat. Why? Because that performance can’t be taken to the political bank.
When it comes to item (c), Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson stated in early March that a NATO application would destabilize the situation facing Sweden and the larger region. What we’ve seen is that as Finland changed its mind about NATO, parts of the Swedish Social Democratic Party changed their mind. No major debates were deemed necessary, deliberations held behind closed doors or rushed through. No mass referendum has been held about whether Sweden should join NATO. Here we see very little democracy, all in the name of a military mobilization to preserve Ukrainian democracy.
Finally, when it comes to item (d), Sweden’s recent real security threats reveal the opportunity costs of focusing on external threats and ignoring domestic ones. During the recent Easter weekend, riots took place in Malmö with “riots, unrest and violent clashes…reported in Stockholm, the central city of Orebro, the eastern cities of Linkoping and Norrkoping and southern town of Landskrona.” Jonas Hysing, the National Police Commander, said “that 26 police and 14 individuals — protesters or other people — [were] injured in the riots and 20 police vehicles destroyed or damaged.” Zero persons injured by Russia. At the same time, others explain that Swedes have become poorer. So, as the military budget is being increased in response to hypothesized threats that don’t exist, money is diverted from needed development for actual threats. Some don’t even talk about the failed security against terrorism, but claim to be all consumed by Sweden’s security. Hint: They are not. Others like Noam Chomsky argue that if Russia can’t even occupy Kiev, it can hardly threaten Finland and Sweden. Real security requires more than political performances.
