By Jonathan Michael Feldman, March 7, 2024
Cecilia Strömberg Wallin, Philip Teir, Thella Johnson, and Bengt Kristensson Uggla at “Nya tider och nya identiteter – om Sverige, Finland och Nato,” at ABF in Stockholm, March 7, 2024. Photo by author.
The Times We Live In
In this essay I will try to explain how some intellectuals view war as something done to their countries, but not something that necessarily involves (demilitarized) choices by them or their countries. The overarching litmus test for respectability now is to argue that Russia’s attack on Ukraine is when “history” begins. Unlike those who simplify the present tragedy in Gaza, I will not argue that October 7th type events are irrelevant even if they are over-deployed to perpetuate slaughter. Rather, I argue that intellectuals must do more than simply act as if war and militarism are external to their own choices and the long-term choices of their states.
What kind of times do we live in? What does it mean to be an intellectual in the Nordic nations today? We got a partial answer to these questions on March 6th, when the Swedish Radio program Filosofiska Rummet held a public event at ABF Stockholm entitled, “Nya tider och nya identiteter – om Sverige, Finland och Nato” (“New Times and New Identities – On Sweden, Finland and NATO.”) The program was led by Cecilia Strömberg Wallin and featured guests included Bengt Kristensson Uggla, Professor of philosophy at Åbo Akademi and board member of Samfundet Sverige-Finland (the co-sponsor with ABF of the event), Philip Teir, an author and cultural journalist, and Thella Johnson, an author, journalist and Swedish Radio’s former Finland correspondent. The program will be broadcast on Sunday, March 10th, 2024 on Swedish Radio (SR).
I have long admired Filosofiska Rummet as a worthy pursuit, a radio program discussing philosophy which Wallin suggested goes deeper into reality than what journalism often does. Yet, I became surprised at what this discussion left out of the picture—precisely the deeper realities which some scholars and even journalists have been willing to address, i.e. militarism designed by Scandinavia (to paraphrase a slogan found in a recent Volvo advertising campaign). So the presence of absences explains the new role for Nordic philosophy, to be a prop that talks past, that talks around, and that displaces militarism. What is militarism? I have argued elsewhere that this term involves the surplus generation of organized violence where these surpluses displace alternatives in diplomacy, equitable development, and disarmament. In fact, as we will see, Sweden has consistently contributed (directly or indirectly) to the military (or economy) of states that later are classified as enemies, e.g. Germany and later Russia.
To set the scene, I will quote from the program notes of the event as published by ABF Stockholm: “Sweden and Finland have been side by side throughout history, yet the realities of our countries have looked so different. Finland with Russia as a neighbor and a population marked by war and the threat of war. Sweden, which lived in peace for over 200 years and which had freedom of alliance as part of its self-image. Who have we been and who will we be? The war in Ukraine changed the security policy situation and now both countries are on their way to join NATO. What does this mean for the relations between the countries and the identity in Sweden and Finland? Welcome to a conversation about the Sweden-Finland relationship in the new era.”
Who Have We Been?: History as Social Amnesia, Swedish Militarism as Choice
The first thing we notice is the claim that Sweden has “lived in peace for over 200 years,” which belies various realities about Sweden and raises immediately the question about what kind of peace Sweden has been involved in. This peace has been a militaristic peace marked by strategic supplies and financial support for either the Weimar Republic and Nazi Germany, Sweden’s assistance in the bombing of Iraq, and Sweden’s helping Americans with kill targets in Afghanistan. Yet, peaceful Sweden is an enduring myth which is a core part of the cultural lore. So much for who we have been.
The self-image of Sweden’s past was based on “freedom of alliance,” but the reality was gradual entrapment—or engagement if you prefer—in NATO. The Swedish government’s own website reads: “Relations between Sweden and NATO date back to 1994 when Sweden joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Since then, Sweden has gradually increased its cooperation with NATO, including by being an Enhanced Opportunities Partner. Sweden has taken part in several military operations and also has a Host Nation Support Agreement with NATO.” Sweden’s so-called “freedom from alliance” was built on U.S.-supplied jet engines (the General Electric F404) for the country’s jet fighters and at one point coproduction arrangements with BAE Systems, Britain’s flagship defense contractor. As Björn Hagelin, one of Sweden’s most important scholars on these questions, explained in an article published in European Security (Vol. 7, Issue 4, 1998): “Gripen aircraft being delivered to the [Royal Swedish Air Force] are partly manufactured by British Aerospace (BAe), and Saab and BAe are, ‘arm in arm’, marketing it abroad.”
In the summary of his dissertation, Mikael Nilsson explains that “the U.S. government used its preponderant position, and pressured Sweden to adapt its policies by withholding vital technology from the Swedes.” This pressure involved “the U.S. refusal to deliver arms to a neutral Scandinavian Defense Union” and led to “Sweden gradually [providing] its concurrence through a series of steps, most importantly the participation in the Marshall Plan in 1948, and COCOM in the summer of 1951.” By the Summer of 1952, “the confirmation of the U.S. government’s acceptance of Sweden came” when the country “was made eligible to buy armaments in the United States under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act (MDAA).” Related to these events, Sweden long cooperated with NATO and U.S. militarism, even behind the backs of Swedish democratic procedures through joint arrangements between the two countries’ militaries as Ola Tunander has explained in an article published in 1999.
Nilsson unpacks the myth of Swedish non-alignment further, when he explains: “Because of its consent to U.S. hegemony Sweden gained access to U.S. missiles at the same time, and many times even before the NATO countries. Sweden was the first Western European country to purchase Sidewinder (1959) and Hawk (1962), and license manufactured two versions of the Falcon missile. Because of these deliveries the development of Swedish surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles was halted. Sweden was dependent upon the U.S. for deliveries of additional missiles in wartime, and this could have become a problem for Sweden’s ability to defend its territory against Western intrusions, since Sweden’s defense was based on help arriving from the West if Sweden was attacked by the USSR.”
Another premise of the radio panel discussion was that “the war in Ukraine changed the security policy situation,” but it would be more accurate to argue that NATO’s eastward expansion, Sweden’s engagement in military exercises conducted near Russia’s borders, and the failure to constrain Ukraine’s engagement with NATO has equally if not more importantly “changed the security policy situation.”
War as the Independent Variable: Nations and Culture versus Classes and Elites
The premise of the Filosofiska Rummet event was that we are living in “new times” with “new identities.” Yet, I suspect we are living in new times marked by an old, complicit identity. What has happened is that the public has been invited to sanction and identify with the erstwhile secretive arrangements with NATO. One of the early ideas in the radio discussion was that Finland has served as a kind of “role model” for Sweden through its joining NATO first. The new times means “closer relations” between the two countries, but these two entities have always been close the panel argued. In fact, you cannot understand one country without understanding the other. That’s what the panelists argued, but the real role model for Sweden is not Finland now, but the United States war machine. A review of Sweden’s history will reveal that while elites claim that Finland’s foreign policy is of primary concern, Sweden has made lots of deals with U.S. foreign policy independent of Finland or its concern. In fact, as noted below, one of the speakers addressed this possibility indirectly by pointing out the limits of the Nordic scale.
Early on it was clear that the idea of “hegemonic isomorphism” was going to be off the table in this discussion. By this term I mean societies dominated by elites who resemble one another by their inability to honestly face their own history and through their servitude to the American military hegemon. Tunander and Nilsson showed us that the elites began this game of engagement with Americans and NATO. Swedish militarists initiated this cooperation which was not part of public culture and mass identity. The mass identity was heading in another direction, myths and fairy tales about a peaceful Sweden—myths that have actually made it easier to make the switch when the time was right. The myths were but a drug that eased the pain for an amputation of the reality of any alternative to “there is no alternative.”
Finland, Sweden and War
Uggla argued that Finnish politicians engaged in a kind of public relations campaign that “Sweden should go together with us” into NATO, when it was clear that politicians could not make a career on a Nordic basis, given the realities of the European Union and (now by extension) NATO. Wallin acknowledged that Sweden was not free from the culture of war, given refugees from war-torn Syria and other locations. Yet, one point that emerged was the idea that perhaps three or four generations of Finns have been affected by the memories of the Winter War, the military engagement with the Soviet Union where Finland lost ten percent of its territory. This war began on November 30, 1939 when the Soviets invaded Finland after failing to gain land concessions they demanded to protect Leningrad. That demand was raised against the backdrop of a rising German militarist expansion, although the Soviet Union invaded Poland on September 13, 1939 after Nazi, Germany did on September 1st of that year. Some historians argue that the Soviets’ cooperation with Germany reflected Stalin’s assessment of the West’s own early repressive tolerance of Hitler.
One argument the radio panelists made was that Finland was “nationalist” but Sweden had embraced an “internationalist” perspective. One speaker said Finland may suffer from “war nostalgia” which was compared to “American patriotism.” Another key point was that discussion of climate change in Sweden, a priority item, has been marginalized now by discussions of war. This critical point was not developed in any detail, however, and amounted to a kind of passing thought. After Ukraine was invaded, the argument went, Sweden has become “more nationalistic and patriotic.” Yet, there was no connection between the role of Swedish elites and the public’s subservience to a trajectory that was clearly planned far in advance of the Russian invasion. The underlying assumption and unspoken idea seems to be that NATO expansion, long-term engagement with U.S. militarism (and German militarism prior to that) and all those other inconvenient truths have to be buried now because Russia is an invader. Yet, Russia is a peculiar invader and villain in our story because Sweden has systematically sponsored it with oil imports that remained steady even after mass Russian slaughter in Chechnya (the late phases of this oil import story have been explained by Greenpeace in a memo published on October 16th of last year).
The program’s producers may believe that their agenda was different from the kinds of questions I am bringing up. Yet, I am most interested in what was not discussed because that seems far more relevant than what was discussed.
Somewhere in this discussion, I figured out “the master narrative” for what was being said. The idea here is that war is an independent variable that causes people to feel things and perhaps do them. War shapes the culture. Yet, what about the very culture of war, where we shape war, where war is the dependent variable?
Sweden has a rich anti-militarist culture. All one has to do is look up the biographies of Inga Thorsson, Oyvind Fahlström, and Siri Karin Derkert, as well as those who followed in their footsteps. But this Sweden is now considered irrelevant by some in what is considered “Swedish,” a floating signifier used selectively to push whatever agenda the speaker has in mind. Over a hundred years ago, Swedes could debate something called “militarism” which meant that states make war, where war was a co-production among various states, not something that was just done to Sweden (or Finland for that matter). The anti-militarist left argued that Sweden’s military investments came at a high domestic, social cost. In 1913, Zeth Höglund co-authored a pamphlet, The Fortified Poorhouse: Antimilitarist and Socialist Handbook (in Swedish, Det befästa fattighuset – Antimilitaristisk och socialistisk handbok) with Fredrik Ström and Hannes Sköld. Clearly, war was a matter not simply of foreign politics, but domestic choices. This part of Swedish culture was nowhere to be seen in Swedish Radio’s discussions. Perhaps these concerns will now be relegated to an “old identity.” The subversive past is inconvenient now.
The War Has Already Arrived: It’s Something Done to Us, Not What We Do
When Carl-Oskar Bohlin, Sweden’s Minister for Civil Defence, said there could be war in Sweden, some Finns (notably a specific journalist who was featured in Swedish TV) reacted strongly and condemned this kind of talk or said that it was not something one could hear in Finland. Uggla seemed to turn the tables on that interpretation, with some panelists heading in his direction as best as I could surmise. Uggla said Finland (and perhaps Sweden) was already facing a “hybrid war.” I found this part of this discussion hard to follow. My impression is that these ideas were conveyed. First, we are already at war with Russia, so the point about Sweden being at war is somewhat of an understatement or not a big deal. Second, this war is designed to “undermine confidence” and “spread fear.” Third, some things about the war threat may be harder to say in Finland than Sweden. Finally, one does not have to “say” what everyone already understands to be true in Finland, i.e. there’s a threat from Russia and a kind of war going on.
The Orwellian Reality of Swedish “Non-Alignment”
Finland has faced what some call a “weaponized migration” coming from Russia, where Russia tries to dump refugees into Finland to destabilize that country. Yet, in its own Orwellian yet slightly more honest way, NATO itself explains that Finland has long been engaged in a military alliance aimed directly at Russia. A NATO post on April 5, 2023 explains: “After almost 30 years of close partnership with NATO, Finland joined the Alliance on 4 April 2023. Finland’s partnership with NATO was historically based on its policy of military non-alignment, which changed following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.” In 2018, Carl Bildt the former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister described in an essay how then “massive NATO exercises in Norway” would “include forces from two key non-NATO countries: Sweden and Finland.” His idea was that “Scandinavia” was “finally breaking with the Cold-War doctrine of neutrality,” and now “embracing a more prudent and proactive defense policy.” On another occasion Bildt had argued that NATO engagement was part of how Sweden remained non-aligned, the Orwellian formulation which NATO itself deployed.
In an essay published earlier in the NATO Review (July 1, 2007), Ryan C. Hendrickson wrote that “although Sweden remains ‘militarily non-aligned,’ it is clear that it is anything but neutral when it comes to NATO. Its activities in Afghanistan, Kosovo, in NATO training operations and in force modernization mean Sweden has both the political will and the military capabilities to be a real ‘security provider’ for the Allies.” This discourse helped serve as a bridge for eventual NATO engagement. Sweden and Finland were in an alliance that could not be called a military alliance. Russia is bad so just “accept the mystery” of being in a military alliance while not being aligned. Essentially, Sweden’s “neutrality” was based on military cooperation with the United States and was not formally aligned but merely aligned with its interests. Then, when it became “non-aligned” it was simply one step closer to formal alignment which could not be called that because Sweden was not formally in NATO. But prior to entering NATO, Sweden was already aligned with the United States for several decades, just not formally so even if Partnership with Peace was a kind of “farm team” (or stepping stone) for future NATO members.
The Security Dilemma or the Self-Fulfilling Militarist Prophecy?
One of the panelists seemed to say that we should feel safer now that we are in NATO, the kind of safety which was expressed by a B-52 bomber (the plane which contributed to massive bombing of Vietnamese civilian targets) passing over Stockholm on the very same day of this event. One panelist said that “we are two small countries in the world,” which I translate into, “our countries have no agency—there is no domestic politics to all this.” And yet Uggla seemed to be saying something else at one critical juncture. He pointed to what international relations scholars call “the security dilemma.” Finland historically had to make choices. It could build up its defense and be viewed as a threat to Russia. Or, it could diminish its military and be more vulnerable to Russian provocations.
Now, the dilemma is solved as Finland and Sweden are closer than they have been in two hundred years. Swedes are more interested in Finland than before. The two countries will be more dependent upon each other. Finland is a “front line” state in what we could call the New Cold War with Russia. Nevertheless, many Finns have had a relationship with Russia, studying the language or having familial ties. At least, some generations had a “curiosity” about the East. Finland had to decide whether it was the most Eastern part of the West or the most western part of the East, said Uggla.
With a view to Russian militarist expansion, Uggla asked whether “we have been naïve” about the Russian threat. He asked the question, “why didn’t we react to the Russian invasion of Crimea (in 2014) more seriously?” All this begs the question of NATO expansion and the long-term cooperation both Finland and Sweden have engaged in, a cooperation which preceded 2014 by decades. Finland entered this non-alliance-which is an alliance in 1994. Russia had a war with Georgia years later in 2008, but a European Union study claimed that this war was started by Georgia. All these are inconvenient facts in a world where war is simply an independent variable that does things to people and is an exogenous force and countries are so small that they have no domestic politics other than to accept their fate and ready themselves for the inevitable. We see a kind of reincarnation of a biblical force and a kind of codified religion based on the United States as the logical savior who hovers over the passive masses. Even when there is a recognition of agency, the lessons are selective. Leading Swedish historians can emphasize “Swedish anti-Nazism and resistance against Nazi Germany during the Second World War,” and the other inconvenient truths be damned. In other words, historians suggest Sweden opposed the very militarism it also helped to support.
Sweden and Finland were never invaded during the period of high neutrality. These two countries did pretty well for themselves. Russia did attack Ukraine, but that invasion is somewhat connected to the expansion of NATO and other Western provocations as various scholars in the United States (who the panelists never referenced) have argued. There were two passing references to Americans during the panel discussion. As an American listening to these tropes, I always feel like an interloper who is eavesdropping on a party that I sneaked into. One reference was about a joke in which Americans only value elephants for their monetary value, while Finns are concerned about what the elephants think about Finns. The other was something about American style patriotism and nationalism. The idea of the Americans as capitalist and warlike is kind of a cultural conceit by some Nordics and an attempt to create an American other. But this conceit is absurd when U.S. B-52 bombers fly over the very city hosting this event on the very day it was broadcast. All these military types secretly cooperating with U.S. militarism for decades, part of the shared elite culture and now extending to the “shared identity” of Sweden and Finland that has finally reached its ultimate and public plateau.
Antiwar Intellectuals
Intellectuals have to be more than servants of the state as Noam Chomsky pointed out in two books, American Power and the New Mandarins and For Reasons of State, published in reaction to the war in Vietnam. In contrast, now the very idea of disarmament is viewed as dangerous, foolish, and irrational. For some intellectuals, there is no longer any tension between themselves and their states. Yet, critical intellectuals were precisely defined by their antagonistic or “agonistic” relationship to their states. Now we have what some refer to as “war philosophers” as in France or those who passively accept militarism, without offering a comprehensive critique of it. There are alternative models which have been described by David L. Schalk in his exemplary book, War and the Ivory Tower, but such anti-militarist intellectuals are not always part of mainstream cultural discourse in Sweden. Basically, a few persons are selected to represent the other side and sometimes they never appear. Yesterday, Swedish Radio produced such a “no show” event.
The Vietnam War, and the reaction to it, became part of Swedish history, a history now relegated to the pejorative wastebin of “whataboutism” by those who love to displace militarism. Jean-Paul Sartre headed the International War Crimes Tribunal which exposed U.S. genocidal policies in Vietnam. This tribunal included a meeting taking place in Stockholm in 1967. Sartre argued that we should judge the times we live in by the individual and the individual by the times.
