The “Rents of Superficiality”: Capitalism and the Left Professional Class

By Jonathan Michael Feldman, November 23, 2024

Deconstruction that Displaces Reconstruction

A colleague recently remarked that various persons in the Left often have no ideas about how to organize society differently or that they lack proposals for solving problems. This issue is just another way of arguing that much of the left is involved in deconstruction rather than reconstruction. As I argued earlier about the Brexit debate: “The Right and Left each search for short cuts. The far Left is totally naive about their capacities and ability to control or manipulate the situation because their deconstructive discourse about the EU is largely divorced from a reconstructive discourse.”

The question at hand is why this deconstructive discourse is dominant among some people, i.e. why is this group associated with deconstruction rather than reconstruction? There are two potential answers. The first answer reflects the direct control system. In the direct control system, some of these individuals are part of a decision-making strata characterized by these characteristics: (a) The individuals have a measure of power over others so they can feel that they change things by exercising their power within their domains, i.e. power over a lower status group; (b) This decision-making power is derivative of even higher status decision-makers, potentially in the ruling class or dominant circles; (c) This higher status group wants to reproduce the system; (d) So the decision-making power of middle range group is constrained by their service to the higher status group, (e) this constraints are organized by patronage systems (where certain ideas gain financial support and others do not), reputational flak or policing organized by managers, media, publication venues and other intermediaries, specialization that prevents an appreciation of the totality or involves a positive fetishism that precludes a priori moral considerations, or the recruitment of individuals who play by certain rules which generate professional advantages.

Where Do Ideas Come From?

Ideas reflect individuals’ values and their biographical trajectory, with that trajectory including interactions with various individuals, texts and places. One potential approach is to argue that ideas simply reflect interests, occupational requirements and class relations. Another approach suggests that beliefs reflect certain paradigms or research programs which replicate ways of thinking and acting or social constructions of reality which can be more or less independent from material forces.

There is a strata of individuals who formulate decisions governing the lives of others. This formulation power gives such individuals power and a capacity to affect outcomes. The power of these individuals usually comes from larger credentialing and decision-making bodies, e.g. doctors, university professors, lawyers, among others are credentialed by various authorities and they then derive their power from such credentialling as well as knowledge and competence.

The Social Organization of Superficiality

There are forms of workplace organization and social codes associated with a certain occupational strata that explain incentives for deconstruction. Long ago, Barbara and John Ehrenreich wrote an essay on “the professional managerial class” (PMC), a class group that was positioned above the working class and below the ruling class. While some may debate whether or not certain classes of workers, like adjunct university professors are part of the working class as opposed to the PMC, we know that there is an occupational hierarchy in the university which can shape one’s occupational status.

The PMC is also associated with regulatory social codes, as Steven Teles at Johns Hopkins pointed out in a recent interview: “one way to think about a lot of the new things that people associate with D.E.I. and race or on campuses is they’re a sort of new form of cultural class etiquette. And Democrats and liberal professions are the ones who generally tell people what to say and how to say it. And that’s whether it’s the media or universities or schools, all the way through: All those institutions that are basically in charge of setting the rules and setting the sort of standards of decorum are now closer to being on the liberal side.” In addition, this control principle can be found in “a lot of the regulatory institutions we have, the things that both regulate us economically and regulate us culturally, are connected to that larger liberal governing project. And so you can think about populism in part as a reaction to that degree that the etiquette- and/or manners-setting parts of our institutions are on one side, and that therefore the residual — the people who are actually the subjects of that regulation — have gradually moved into the Republican Party.”

The left does not necessarily represent an alternative pole to the Democrats and Republicans in providing a space free from managerial interference. According to the Ehrenreichs, the PMC has an influential role in the left. For example, the old Socialist Party “had a large working-class membership,” but “most of the top leadership and a vastly disproportionate part of the membership were engaged in PMC (and old middle class) occupations (or have seen so engaged before assuming full-time party duties).” Prior to World War I, the Socialist Party was close to “the PMC’s technocratic vision.” Socialism came to mean “government ownership of the means of production (which would still be administered by experts) and expansion of government social services (which would still be supplied by professionals).”

The Rents of Superficiality

Superficiality contains advantages which produce a form of rent that creates not only political power advantages, but also economic ones. The division of labor that produces the PMC creates a kind of charter system, analogous to land charters. In this charter system, the patrons at the top of the system provide licenses to the PMC which grant them a measure of professional autonomy in exchange for service to the higher system. Only a very narrow group of persons can use this license to advocate deep systemic social change. When this occurs there is a risk that the advocacy takes a paternalistic or obsequious turn, neither or which is ideal. The paternalism occurs when someone becomes an authority who talks down to the audience. The obsequiousness occurs when someone talks up to the audience, telling them exactly what they want to hear. There is nothing dialogic to such discourse. Simone Weil and Hannah Arendt were among the thinkers who understood how political parties or the inflation of opinion crowd out necessary truths. This crowding out is part of the normal workings of various systems in which individuals collect rents for being superficial.

The specialization, obsequiousness, and power accumulation found in superficiality rents keeps the system going. Seymour Melman once argued that various parties in the left aspired to be “an alternative group of managers.” When I approached a leader or facilitator (or whatever the person wanted to be called) in the 2011 Occupy Movement about collaborating in the first Global Teach-In, I was told something along the lines that “we represent libertarian conservatives, Socialists, and other tendencies, so we can commit to being involved in your event” i.e. truths were less relevant than coalitional (popular) formations that displace truth. Melman was also aware of this lowest common denominator aspect of politics. The formula builds on the logic of marketing and why various companies do not take political stands. They don’t want to offend their potential customers and by avoiding that offense, they gain profits in return. Part of the political left is no different.

Appendix: Inquiry to Claude AI, November 23, 2024

In support of this inquiry, I posed the following question to an AI program: What are the unwritten rules of the game that make persons in the professional managerial class: a) politically docile, b) antagonistic to utopian thinking, and c) actively promoters of deconstruction or ad hoc piecemeal liberal solutions?

I aim to analyze this complex question by breaking down several key social and professional dynamics that shape PMC (Professional Managerial Class) behavior:

  1. Political Docility:
  • Career advancement depends on avoiding controversy
  • Institutional hierarchies reward conformity and “professionalism”
  • Financial stability/benefits create risk aversion
  • Professional networks require maintaining relationships across political lines
  1. Antagonism to Utopian Thinking:
  • Professional training emphasizes incremental, evidence-based approaches
  • Management culture focuses on measurable short-term results
  • Career success requires “pragmatic” problem-solving
  • Professional credentialing systems reward technical expertise over systemic critique
  1. Promotion of Piecemeal Solutions:
  • Project-based work encourages narrow scope
  • Funding structures incentivize limited, measurable interventions
  • Professional advancement comes from demonstrating specific expertise
  • Institutional constraints make radical change seem impractical

These dynamics are reinforced through:

  • Performance reviews and promotion criteria
  • Professional development and training
  • Workplace cultural norms
  • Network effects/social capital
  • Economic incentives tied to existing systems

This analysis suggests the PMC’s behavior stems from interlocking professional, economic, and social incentive structures rather than explicit rules or policies.